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Abstract
Clinical researchers often select among and evaluate risk prediction
models using standard machine learning metrics based on confusion ma-
trices. However, if these models are used to allocate interventions to
patients, standard metrics calculated from retrospective data are only re-
lated to model utility (in terms of reductions in outcomes) under certain
assumptions. When predictions are delivered repeatedly throughout time
(e.g. in a patient encounter), the relationship between standard met-
rics and utility is further complicated. Several kinds of evaluations have
been used in the literature, but it has not been clear what the target of
estimation is in each evaluation. We synthesize these approaches, deter-
mine what is being estimated in each of them, and discuss under what
assumptions those estimates are valid. We demonstrate our insights using
simulated data as well as real data used in the design of an early warn-
ing system. Our theoretical and empirical results show that evaluations
without interventional data either do not estimate meaningful quantities,
require strong assumptions, or are limited to estimating best-case scenario
bounds.
1 Introduction
Predictive models are now being deployed across healthcare settings to assist
in diagnosis, prognosis, and risk stratification. In particular, these models are
being used to trigger interventions for high-risk patients in hospital settings.
While some risk models deliver a single prediction at a static timepoint during
an inpatient encounter (e.g., at hospital admission), other models deliver risk
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scores or alerts repeatedly through time. For example, the Advanced Alert
Monitor described by Kipnis et al. [1], provides hourly scores that estimate the
risk that an inpatient will deteriorate within the next 12 hours. If the risk is
above a 5% threshold, the system fires an alert that, after clinical review, can
trigger a rescue intervention. Similar risk scores have been developed that are
designed to initiate interventions to prevent sepsis, kidney injury, and other
adverse outcomes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Most of these systems have
evolved from traditional acuity or risk scores that were manually calculated
and used intermittently, but are now capable of producing real-time scores by
leveraging electronic health record data. [5, 12, 13].
The ultimate goal of these risk model-triggered alert systems is to reduce the
incidence of an adverse outcome, while also minimizing the number of necessary
interventions [14, 15]. Thus, for two models that have an identical potential
for mitigating an adverse outcome, the model that results in fewer interven-
tions would be more desirable. Ideally, each model’s benefit would be assessed
through randomized clinical trials. Clinical trials for these systems are partic-
ularly appealing because the alert system could be active in the intervention
arm, while it could be suppressed in the control arm. The outcome rates among
the two groups could then be compared to assess the change in outcome rates
attributable to the model-triggered intervention. To account for the clinical
workload of the system, the total number of alerts (per patient, per day, etc.)
would be also be tallied. The final utility of the system could be determined
using a tradeoff between the number of prevented outcomes at the cost of the
number of incurred interventions, depending on how these are valued by stake-
holders [16, 15, 17, 14, 18, 19, 9]. Multiple models could also be compared in
this way by randomizing which model triggers the intervention during a given
encounter.
Unfortunately, large randomized trials may not be feasible for every proposed
model-based alert system, either due to cost, time, or uncertain equipoise. Non-
randomized prospective evaluations are possible, but these also require model
deployment. Because of these limitations, researchers frequently rely on retro-
spective data for model evaluation or alert threshold selection. However, many
prediction model developers also fail to consider the specific intervention that
their models will actually trigger. Since the intervention is not known a-priori,
we can only assume that it is not present in our retrospective data. While
some models may trigger an existing intervention, if we cannot specify what
it is, we must assume it is a new, as-of-yet unimplemented intervention that
is not present in our data. The inherent assumptions and implications of us-
ing non-interventional retrospective data for model evaluation have been poorly
addressed, particularly in the repeated-prediction setting. A number of differ-
ent evaluation strategies have been used without using a framework for critical
assessment or comparison. Our primary goal is to uncover what, if anything,
these evaluation strategies are actually estimating and to offer guidance on how
to best evaluate repeated-predictions models.
2
1.1 Outline
For models that deliver a single prediction per independent patient (or en-
counter, etc.), standard performance metrics derived from confusion matrices
(e.g. sensitivity) calculated using retrospective data are often used to describe
clinical utility in terms of preventable outcomes and additional workloads. How-
ever, it is not commonly appreciated that these performance metrics are merely
proxies for clinical utility under certain assumptions, and that maximizing them
should not be the end goal in and of itself [20, 21, 22]. We will therefore first
review the basis of these evaluation metrics for single-prediction models and
demonstrate how they are used as proxies for clinical utility.
After doing this, we will move on to evaluation schemes for models that
deliver repeated predictions (e.g. multiple scores throughout a single hospital-
ization). The lack of an a-priori theoretical justification for evaluation has led
to several methods described in the literature. In fact, for most of these eval-
uations, what exactly is being estimated is poorly described. Using a unified
theoretical framework, we will review these differing approaches and demon-
strate why it is not trivial to extend approaches based on confusion matrices to
repeated-predictions models.
2 Evaluating Single-Prediction Models
For prediction models that deliver a single prediction per encounter or patient,
standard evaluation metrics based on the confusion matrix of the predictions
and outcomes in retrospective data (a.k.a. the 2x2 table or contingency table)
are reasonably useful proxies for the anticipated reduction in outcomes and
workload. We first describe this heuristically and then bolster these concepts
with mathematical rigor.
Consider, for instance, a prediction model that runs at the time a baby is
born and which triggers an alert if the baby’s risk of developing sepsis in the
next week exceeds 5%. We are completely agnostic to how this model was
trained in the first place. However, using unseen retrospective data, we can
tally the number of cases where the alert would have fired and the baby did go
on to develop sepsis- these would be our ”true positives”. Similarly, we could
calculate the false positives, false negatives, and true negatives. These counts
constitute the four cells of the familiar confusion matrix, which can the be used
to calculate metrics like sensitivity, specificity, and precision.
For single-prediction models, the counts in the confusion matrix are, un-
der relatively simple assumptions, related to we are interested in: how many
outcomes could we potentially prevent, and for how many alerts.
The number of true positives represents the maximum number of outcomes
that we could ever hope to prevent with the interventions that follow the alert.
In almost every scenario, because interventions are not perfectly effective, fewer
actual outcomes will be prevented. Some outcomes will not be preventable,
even if they were foretold (i.e. the true positives overestimate the number of
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prevented outcomes). Conversely, outcomes that did occur and were not foretold
would still have occurred without the alert system (i.e. no false negatives can
be prevented by the alert system). Thus, the number of true positives is an
upper bound on the number of outcomes the alert system could prevent.
However, the upper bound is still useful for comparison under the assump-
tion that there is no heterogeneity in the effect (i.e. the intervention equally
reduces everyone’s chance of an outcome). For instance, assume that an inter-
vention triggered by the alert has a 50/50 chance of preventing an outcome that
otherwise would have happened, regardless of the patient. Thus, if model A pro-
duced 100 true positives it would translate into 50 prevented outcomes, whereas
for model B which produces 80 true positives, it would only translate into 40
prevented outcomes. Under these assumptions, model A would be deemed supe-
rior because it could prevent more outcomes. This relationship holds even if the
percentage of outcomes prevented by the intervention (i.e. the treatment effect
of the intervention) is unknown. If the treatment effect is constant across pa-
tients, the ratio of the true positives between two models would still correspond
to the ratio of prevented outcomes.
Note, however, that this may not be the case, so statistics calculated from
these counts (e.g. sensitivity, specificity) may not actually track with the clinical
utility of a model, even for single-prediction models. Consider two models that
both have 100 true positives and 100 false negatives. Imagine that there are
two kinds of high-risk patients: patients who are high-risk, but won’t respond
to treatment (perhaps they are ”too far gone”) and patients who are high-risk
but will respond. If one model correctly classifies the high-risk, low-response
patients, but not the high-risk, high-response patients, its utility will be far
worse than a model that correctly classifies the high-risk, high-response patients,
but not the high-risk, low-response patients. This happens despite the fact that
both of these models have the same number of true positives and false negatives
(thus the same sensitivity). In other words, if patients who are most at risk
are not necessarily those who may benefit the most from intervention, standard
metrics will not track with model utility [20].
The total number of alerts incurred by a single-prediction model-based alert
system is also easily calculated from retrospective data: it is the total number of
predicted positives- the false positives plus the the true positives. This number
is exact in the sense that if an alert would have fired in retrospective data, we
know it would have fired in the same scenario prospectively.
2.1 Potential Outcomes
These ideas can be pinned down with some mathematical notation in the po-
tential outcomes framework [23]. Let W be the alert status (and thus the inter-
vention), and X a vector of predictors or covariates that are used in a model f
to trigger the alert (i.e. W = f(X)). Let Y (0) be the outcome that we would
have observed had the intervention not occurred and let Y (1) be the outcome
had the intervention been triggered. When f is used to control the alert, the
observed outcome is Y = Y (0)(1 − f(X)) + Y (1)f(X). In other words, when
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the intervention happens, we observe Y (1), and when it doesn’t, we observe
Y (0). The number of outcomes among n patients when using the model f to
trigger alerts is nE[Y ] = nE[Y (1)f(X)+Y (0)(1− f(X))] where the expectation
is over the entire eligible population. The number of alerts among n patients is
nE[W ] = E[f(X)].
2.1.1 Estimating Prevented Outcomes
The expected number of outcomes (per patient) when using a model f to trigger
alerts is
Ef [Y ]/n = E[Y
(1)f(X) + Y (0)(1 − f(X))]
= E[(Y (1) − Y (0))f(X) + Y (0)]
= E[E[(Y (1) − Y (0))f(X)|X = x]] + E[Y (0)]
= E[(µ(1)(X)− µ(0)(X))f(X)] + E[Y (0)]
where µ(1)(x) and µ(0)(x) are the conditional means of the potential out-
comes under the intervention and no intervention conditions, respectively. If
the ratio between these two is a constant risk ratio ρ = µ(1)(x)/µ(0)(x) for all
x, then we have
Ef [Y ]/n = E[(µ
(1)(X)− µ(0)(X))f(X)] + E[Y (0)]
= (ρ− 1)E[µ(0)(X)f(X)] + E[Y (0)]
These expectations are easily estimated using retrospective data. The key
observation is that we can treat the retrospective data (including predicted
alerts W as samples from the joint distribution of (Y (0),W,X). We only ever
observe Y (0), regardless of W , because in the retrospective data no alert ever
fired and thus no intervention was actually delivered.
Because of this, E[Y (0)] is the rate of outcomes observed in the retrospective
data E[Y ] and is thus estimated by nY=1/n, the empirical rate of outcomes in
the retrospective data. E[µ(0)(X)f(X)] is the long-run average of how many
times the outcome co-occurred with an alert in the retrospective data, so it is es-
timated by nY=1,W=1/n, the empirical rate of true positives in the retrospective
data.
Thus an unbiased estimate of the number of outcomes expected when using
the model f is
nY=1 − (1− ρ)nY=1,f(X)=1
nY=1 is the total number of outcomes observed in the retrospective data,
meaning that using the model f would prevent (1 − ρ)nY=1,f(X)=1 outcomes
among n patients prospectively. The risk ratio ρ is not known in general, but the
best-case scenario is ρ = 0, meaning that an estimated nY=1,f(X)=1 outcomes
would be prevented among n prospective patients. This is an upper bound that
holds no matter what ρ actually is, and even if there is heterogeneity of effect.
It is thus a useful, relatively assumption-free quantity.
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However, if we are willing to assume a constant population-wide risk ratio,
the number of true positives also facilitates the comparison of two models on the
basis of prevented outcomes (not an upper bound), even if we do not actually
know what that risk ratio is. Proceeding from above, the estimated difference
in outcomes between two models f and g both triggering the same intervention
with risk ratio ρ is
(ρ− 1)(ny=1,f(x)=1 − ny=1,g(x)=1)
The (possibly unknown) risk ratio ρ is fixed, so the difference in estimated
prospective outcomes depends only on the difference in the number of observed
true positives in the retrospective data. That means that the number of out-
comes prevented by a model will track with its estimated sensitivity as long as
the risk ratio of the intervention is assumed to be constant across the population.
2.1.2 Estimating Alert Workload
The number of prospectively incurred alerts is estimated using the empirical
number of alerts that would have fired in the retrospective data because the
distribution of covariates in the retrospective and prospective data are presumed
to be the same. So nE[W ] = nE[f(X)], which is estimated by nW=1 =
∑
w.
3 Evaluating Repeated Prediction Models
Instead of predicting at a fixed point in time, many authors are now consid-
ering models that deliver predictions repeatedly over a patient encounter. For
instance, a model might predict a patient’s 12-hour risk of kidney injury at ev-
ery hour during their hospital stay. Again, we make no assumption about how
these models may be trained, but we assume that we have access to a previously
unseen retrospective sample of data (i.e. a test set).
The evaluation of models that make repeated predictions is more complicated
than for models that make single predictions, although to our knowledge this
has not been explicitly pointed out in the literature. The complications in this
setting are that the relationship between intervention and outcome is mediated
through time and that interventions can affect the trajectory of a patient, mak-
ing the portions of the retrospective data after an initial alert unrepresentative
of what would be observed prospectively.
Several approaches have been used to evaluate models of this kind.
Cheng et al. [7], Avati et al. [24], and Churpek et al. [3] do not specify a-
priori when an alert will fire. Approaches of this kind do not accurately estimate
any relevant quantity and would be impossible to apply prospectively because
it is unclear when the model would be used to trigger an alert and when it
would not. For instance, for patients who experienced an outcome Cheng et al.
[7] use their model to predict a certain number of days before that outcome.
Prospectively, however, it would be impossible to know which patients would
go on have an outcome and, if so, exactly when. It would thus be impossible to
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use the model in this way. We will not further discuss these approaches and do
not recommend their use.
Koyner et al. [25] and Prytherch et al. [2] use an aggregated time evaluation,
in which each timepoint of retrospective data is labeled as a true positive, false
negative, etc. depending on whether an alert fired in that timepoint and whether
or not an outcome occurred in the proceeding lookahead period. Although it
appears to do so, this approach may not correctly estimate quantities like the
positive predictive value of an alert (i.e., given that there was an alert for a
random patient at a random timepoint, how likely is it that an outcome occurs
in the next lookahead period?). The reason for this failure is that the joint
distribution of alerts and outcomes in the retrospective data is generally not the
same as that of the prospective data, since, once an alert occurs prospectively,
all future quantities are presumably affected.
Shickel et al. [26], Meiring et al. [8], and others [6, 13] perform separate
evaluations of their model at each timepoint, an approach that we will call the
fixed time evaluation. This approach is essentially the single-prediction evalu-
ation strategy, which assumes that the repeated-prediction model will actually
only be used at a single timepoint. However, if the model is used at multiple
timepoints in practice, the performance characteristics at timepoints past the
first will not be accurately reflected by the estimates.
Henry et al. [10] count the number of outcomes in any period after an alert
as true positives and do not count any alerts after the first towards the alert
total. We call this the first alert evaluation method. This estimates an upper
bound on the rate of preventable outcomes and accurately estimates the rate of
prospectively incurred alerts, assuming all alerts for a patient will be ignored
after the first.
3.1 Potential Outcomes
What follows is all borrowed from the causal inference literature on time-
varying treatments [27]. Let Wt represent the alert at timepoint t. For sim-
plicity, we will assume a fixed, maximum timepoint denoted T for what fol-
lows. Denote a trajectory of measurements up to but not including time t as
~At = [A0, A1, . . . At−1]. At each point t, there are now 2
t possible potential
outcomes. For instance, at time t = 2, there were either no preceding alerts
( ~W2 = [0, 0]), or there was an alert at the first timepoint ( ~W2 = [1, 0]), or the
second ( ~W2 = [0, 1]), or both ( ~W2 = [1, 1]). We denote the potential outcome
at time t corresponding to treatment ~Wt using the notation Y
( ~Wt)
t . The values
of the covariates also now have counterfactual distributions, which we denote
X
( ~Wt)
t .
We must assume that the outcomes Yt and covariates Xt that we observe
at each time in the retrospective data are the potential outcomes Y
(~0t)
t and
covariates X
(~0t)
t corresponding to the alert trajectory Wt = [0, 0, . . . 0], since no
alerts were actually fired in this data.
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In the prospective setting, we would apply the alert system triggered by the
model f . Because the alerts are triggered by a predictive model f , we have
a dynamic treatment strategy that complicates the construction of what the
observed data would be in terms of the counterfactuals. For instance, consider
the covariates we observe at time t = 1 given that f is used to trigger the alerts.
In our notation, that quantity would be X
([f(X0)])
1 . Note that this random
variable is not distributed as the potential covariate X
([0])
1 nor as the potential
covariate X
([1])
1 . It is a mixture of the two:
X
([f(X0)])
1 = X
([0])
1 10(f(X0)) +X
([1])
1 11(f(X0))
Now consider the covariates at time t = 2, which would beX
([f(X0),f(X1,[f(X0)])])
2 .
This is an even more complex mixture. The notation is extremely cumbersome
at this point, so we will denote these quantities at time t using the simplified
notation X
(f)
t (and Y
(f)
t for the outcomes). Do remember, however, that these
variables are complex mixtures that depend on the contemporaneous potential
variables and the preceding potential variables.
The fundamental problem we face when using retrospective data to evaluate
an alert system is that the data we have are samples from ( ~X(
~0), ~Y (
~0)), whereas
we are interested in estimating quantities we would observe in the counterfactual
universe ( ~X(f), ~Y (f)) in which alerts are being triggered by a model f .
This is at heart the same problem that exists in the single-prediction setting,
where we observe (X,Y (0)) but are interested in (X,Y (f(X))). However, in the
single-prediction setting, postulating a simple relationship between Y (1) and
Y (0) is enough to allow calculation of all relevant counterfactual quantities. In
the repeated-prediction setting, future patient covariates and outcomes depend
on the history of past interventions, meaning that a) there are many, many
more possible counterfactual universes that need to be related to each other by
some assumptions and b) the relationships between these counterfactuals are
themselves much more complicated because of the dynamics through time.
The retrospective data, then, are largely inadequate to support a meaningful
evaluation of the model. As we will see, there are many summary statistics that
may be calculated using these data, but they may not have clear and useful
interpretations in terms of an expected reduction in outcomes or an expected
alert workload.
Aggregated Time The aggregated time evaluation uses the retrospective
data at all timepoints to populate a confusion matrix. The ”estimate” is the
value of the alert at any timepoint Wt = f(Xt), and the ”truth” is whether
or not an outcome occurred in a lookahead period of a certain length: Y˜t =∑
τ∈(t,t+T ] Yτ . The values forWt and Y˜t for each patient-timepoint are then used
to tally up the number of true positives: nWt=1,Y˜t=1, false positives: nWt=1,Y˜t=0,
etc.
This evaluation is direct extension of how a standard machine learning model
might be trained in order to predict an outcome within a lookahead period. In
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that sense, it is the evaluation that most researchers or data scientists trained
in machine learning might immediately reach for. Unfortunately, however, the
confusion matrix counts in this evaluation are not useful in estimating any
meaningful quantity without heroic assumptions.
Patient Time Alert? Outcome in lookahead period? label
1 1 0 0 True Negative
1 2 0 0 True Negative
1 3 1 0 False Positive
1 4 0 1 False Negative
1 5 1 1 True Positive
2 1 0 0 True Negative
2 2 0 0 True Negative
2 3 1 0 False Positive
Table 1: Example data structure for the aggregated time evaluation
For instance, it is tempting to treat the number nWt=1 as an estimate
of nE[
∑
W
(f)
t ], the total number of alerts that would fire among n patients
throughout their stays. However, this does not take into account the fact that
the ”observed alerts” in the retrospective data did not actually occur. If they
had, all of the data subsequent to those alerts would have been affected and
different from what was actually observed. nWt=1 is in fact an estimate of
nE[
∑
W
(~0)
t ]: the number of alerts that would fire among n patients assuming
that those alerts are ”silent” and cannot affect future patient covariates that
would determine future alerts. Therefore, unless the alerts do not affect future
patient covariates (e.g. physiology), the number of alerts “observed” in the ret-
rospective data will not be representative of the number that would be observed
if the alert system were running. The number of ”true positives” nWt=1,Y˜t=1
is similarly unrepresentative of the number of outcomes that would have been
potentially prevented in some lookahead period by an alert.
Thus, without strong assumptions to relate the quantities nE[
∑
W
(~0)
t ] and
nE[
∑
W
(f)
t ] or nE[
∑
Y
(~0)
t ] and nE[
∑
Y
(f)
t ], the numbers nWt=1 and nWt=1,Y˜t=1
are not meaningful. Metrics such as sensitivity, precision, etc. derived from the
aggregated time evaluation will therefore not relate to any useful notion of clin-
ical utility.
Fixed Time The fixed time evaluation considers the retrospective data at
a single timepoint t = t∗ to populate the counts in a confusion matrix. The
”estimate” is the value of the alert at that time: W˜ = Wt∗ = f(Xt∗), while the
”truth” is whether or not an outcome occurred at any point after that time:
Y˜ =
∑T
t=t∗ Yt (assuming, for simplicity, that the outcome can only occur once).
The values for W˜ and Y˜ for each patient are then used to tally up the number
of true positives: nW˜=1,Y˜=1, false positives: nW˜=1,Y˜=0, etc.
In effect, the fixed time evaluation reduces a repeated-prediction model to
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Patient Time Alert? Outcome in future? label
1 5 1 0 False Positive
2 5 1 1 True Positive
3 5 0 0 True Negative
4 5 0 1 False Negative
Table 2: Example data structure for the fixed time evaluation
a single-prediction model that is used at time t∗. Consequently, all of the
arguments justifying the utility of the single prediction metrics are applicable to
the fixed time evaluation as well. Denote e
(w)
t = [0, 0, . . . w, 0, 0, . . . 0]: a vector
of length t with the value w at element t∗. In the fixed time evaluation, the
only two possible treatment trajectories are e
(0)
T and e
(1)
T , since the alert cannot
fire either before or after time t∗. In the derivation of the outcome and alert
rates, we can replace Y by Y˜ , W by W˜ and the potential outcomes Y (w) with
Y˜ (w) =
∑T
t=t∗ Y
(
e
(w)
t
)
t . The derivation then proceeds identically.
Therefore the total number of positives nW˜=1 is an unbiased estimate for
nE[W˜ ] = nE[f(X
(~0)
t∗ )]. This is the number of patients for whom we expect
alerts to fire out of n patients at time t∗, assuming the alert system was not
turned on until that point in time. Without different and likely much more
heroic assumptions, nW∗=1 does not estimate the alert count we would expect
to observe prospectively at time t∗ if the alert system were turned on before t∗,
which would be nE[f(X
(f)
t∗ )]. It also does not represent the total alert count
that would be incurred by the system if it were running at all times, which
would be nE[
∑
t f(X
(f)
t )].
Similarly, nW˜=1,Y˜=1 is the maximum possible number of outcomes that could
be prevented by using the model f to trigger an alert system at time t∗, as-
suming the alert system was not turned on until that point in time. This is not
an estimate of the maximum reduction in outcomes we could expect if the alert
system were running continuously. And, as is the case in the single-prediction
setting, it is not possible to estimate anything other than a bound on the reduc-
tion of outcomes without unsubstantiated assumptions about the relationship
between Y˜ (0) and Y˜ (1).
Look-ahead Prediction Windows In the literature, the fixed-time eval-
uation is often used in conjunction with a lookahead window for the outcome.
In other words the ”truth” is only positive if the outcome occurred in some
window of length T after t∗: Y˜ =
∑
t∈(t∗,t∗+T ] Yt. This outcome definition is
then used to populate the counts in the confusion matrix.
The problem with using look-ahead windows is that they can complicate the
interpretation of the upper bound on the reduction in outcomes. If, ultimately,
we are really only interested in reducing outcomes in a window of fixed length
after t∗, then there is no issue: nW˜=1,Y˜=1 is a fair estimate of the maximum
number of outcomes we could hope to reduce in that window. If, on the other
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hand, we are ultimately interested in the total number of outcomes prevented
(say, throughout the hospitalization), the number of “true positives” from this
evaluation is not useful. On the one hand, nW˜=1,Y˜=1 is an overestimate of the
true number of outcomes that would be prevented in the lookahead period (since
it is an upper bound). On the other hand, it could also be an underestimate
of the total number of outcomes prevented in the future, since some outcomes
that are further out in time than T could also be prevented. Thus nW˜=1,Y˜=1 is
not conclusively either a lower or upper bound on the total number of outcomes
prevented by alerting based on the model f at time t∗, but not before. Without
heroic assumptions about how the treatment effect of the intervention triggered
by the alert varies in time, this is not an informative quantity. Sensitivity, pre-
cision, and other derived measures are thus likewise uninformative in the fixed
time evaluation.
In conclusion, the fixed time evaluation can accurately estimate the number
of alerts that would be produced by a system that is turned on only for a given
timepoint, but not before or after. It can also estimate an upper bound on the
number of outcomes that such a system could conceivably prevent, but that
bound is of questionable utility for comparison between models if the interven-
tion is time-sensitive. In practice, the fixed-time evaluation is often repeated
for each timepoint and the results compared in order to decide at what time the
model should be run. The results are not useful if the model is meant to run
continuously.
First Alert The first alert evaluation discards all alerts after the first and
considers all outcomes after that alert to have been correctly predicted. Any
alerts after an outcome are also discarded. This corresponds to the scenario
where the alert system is running “continuously” (i.e. at each timepoint), but
is turned off after any alert or outcome for a given patient.
Patient Any alert? Any outcome? label
1 0 0 True Negative
2 1 0 False Positive
3 0 1 False Negative
4 1 1 True Positive
Table 3: Example data structure for the first alert evaluation
We can encode the condition that the alert system is turned off after a first
alert or outcome by introducing a new alerting function
f˜(xt, ~wt, ~yt) =
{
f(xt) if ~wt = ~0, ~yt = ~0
0 else
But instead of complicating our notation, we will continue to use f(xt) when
really we mean f˜(xt, ~wt, ~yt).
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For each observation, let a random variable TW denote the time of the first
alert, if any, or 0 if there was no alert. Then, in terms of the unobserved
counterfactuals, the observed (retrospective) data are W˜ =
∑TW f(X(~0)t ) and
Y˜ =
∑T
Y
(~0)
t (again assuming for simplicity only a single outcome is possible
per encounter).
Our first result is that the number of observed first alerts nW˜=1 is an
unbiased estimate of the number of first alerts that would be observed in a
prospective dataset with the same number of patients. The reason for this is
that
∑TW f(X(~0)t ) = ∑TW f(X(f)t ) because, by definition, X(f)t = X(~0)t when
t ≤ TW (i.e. the conditioned random variable X
(f)
t |t ≤ TW is X
(~0)
t ). Assuming
that alerts after the first are ignored or “snoozed”, this is an unbiased estimate
of the alert workload that would be incurred by using the model f to trigger
alerts.
The number of observed true positives nW˜=1,Y˜=1 is an upper bound for
the number of outcomes that could possibly be prevented by triggering alerts
using the model f . Although the mathematics become somewhat convoluted,
the intuition is simple: any outcomes that happen after a first alert would have
gone off are outcomes that potentially could have been prevented. The proof is
as follows.
The difference in outcomes between using the model f to alert and issuing
no alerts is
nE
[∑T
0 Y
(~0)
t −
∑T
0 Y
(f)
t
]
= nE
[∑TW
0 Y
(~0)
t −
∑TW
0 Y
(f)
t +
∑T
t=TW
Y
(~0)
t −
∑T
t=TW
Y
(f)
t
]
= nE
[∑T
t=TW
(
Y
(~0)
t − Y
(f)
t
)]
Abbreviate Z =
∑T
0 f(X
(f)
t ). Note Z ∈ 0, 1 since either no alert fires or a
single alert fires. Furthermore, note that the quantity
∑T
t=TW
(
Y
(~0)
t − Y
(f)
t
)
|Z =
0 is 0 because Z = 0 implies there were no alerts, meaning Y
(~0)
t = Y
(f)
t for all
t. Then, continuing,
= nE
[∑T
t=TW
(
Y
(~0)
t − Y
(f)
t
)
|Z = 0
]
P (Z = 0) + nE
[∑T
t=TW
(
Y
(~0)
t − Y
(f)
t
)
|Z = 1
]
P (Z = 1)
= nE
[∑T
t=TW
(
Y
(~0)
t − Y
(f)
t
)
|Z = 1
]
P (Z = 1)
= nE
[∑T
t=TW
Y
(~0)
t |Z = 1
]
P (Z = 1)− nE
[∑T
t=TW
Y
(f)
t |Z = 1
]
P (Z = 1)
The best-case scenario is that the alert prevents all future outcomes, i.e. that∑T
t=TW
Y
(f)
t = 0. Under this assumption, the difference in expected outcomes
is
nE
[
T∑
t=TW
Y
(~0)
t |Z = 1
]
P (Z = 1)
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However, we have already shown above that Z =
∑T
0 f(X
(f)
t ) is actually
equal to W˜ =
∑T
0 f(X
(0)
t ) when all alerts after the first are ignored and that
the expected value of this quantity is estimated by nW˜=1/n. Furthermore, the
expectation in this expression is the same as E[Y˜ |W˜ = 1], which is estimated
by nY˜=1,W˜=1/nW˜=1. Thus we have that an unbiased estimate of the expected
number of prevented outcomes using a perfectly effective intervention among n
patients when using f to trigger alerts, and silencing alerts after the first alert
or outcome, is
n
(
nY˜=1,W˜=1
nW˜=1
)(nW˜=1
n
)
= nY˜=1,W˜=1
Since the intervention in practice will not be perfectly effective, this rep-
resents an upper bound on the number of outcomes that could be prevented
with the alert system configured as specified. It is also possible to assume∑T
t=TW
Y
(f)
t 6= 0 (i.e. an intervention that isn’t perfect) and arrive at an esti-
mate of the number of prevented outcomes. For instance, we could assume a
particular risk ratio
∑T
t=TW
Y
(f)
t = ρ
∑T
t=TW
Yt,0, which implies that the alert
prevents a fraction ρ of all future outcomes that otherwise would have occurred.
However, without external basis for making this assumption, the result would
not be meaningfully interpretable as a bound. Despite that, this estimate could
prove useful as a sensitivity analysis.
It is not sensible to use a look-ahead prediction window in the first alert
evaluation. While it’s easy to define a period of time after each alert, defin-
ing where that window should be for patients who did not trigger an alert is
ambiguous and could not be done prospectively.
In conclusion, the first alert evaluation can accurately estimate the number
of alerts that would be produced by a system that runs continuously until an
alert or outcome occurs, after which it is switched off. It can also estimate an
upper bound on the number of outcomes that such a system could conceivably
prevent, but, as with the fixed alert evaluation, that bound is of questionable
utility for comparison between models if the intervention is time-sensitive.
4 Example: Simulated Data
To make these ideas concrete we will use simulated data in which we can recreate
both the model building and evaluation process from non-interventional retro-
spective data as well as a (simulated) prospective randomized trial to perform
a final evaluation.
4.1 Setup
Our simulated “patients” are in fact point masses translating on a line. All
patients experience a constant rightward force (e.g. propulsion), as well as a
force that varies randomly at each time point (e.g. a buffeting wind). Each
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patient therefore moves back and forth along a line according to these forces.
The patient covariates are their current position, velocity, and acceleration.
Patients start at rest at the origin and are considered to have an “outcome”
when they have crossed more than one unit to the right, after which point they
are frozen. Patients can therefore only experience a single outcome. We also
assume the existence of an intervention that, when applied, imparts a strong
leftward force at the time it is applied. The intervention can thus come too late
if a patient is already moving rightward with too much momentum.
We used this simulation to generate a training dataset of 500 patients, each
with 20 timepoints worth of data, and test dataset with the same number of
patients and timepoints per patient. No interventions were applied in the gen-
eration of either of these datasets. We used the training data to fit a logistic
regression model to predict whether the patient would suffer an outcome in the
next 5 timepoints based on the current covariates. We then used risk cutoffs
of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 to generate four different alert models, and configured
them so that no alerts would fire if the patient had already experienced either
an alert or outcome.
Evaluation Threshold True Positives Positives
Aggregated Time 0.2 289 908
Fixed Time 0.2 31 42
First Alert 0.2 702 908
Aggregated Time 0.4 324 435
Fixed Time 0.4 32 32
First Alert 0.4 348 435
Aggregated Time 0.6 96 136
Fixed Time 0.6 11 11
First Alert 0.6 98 136
Aggregated Time 0.8 13 21
Fixed Time 0.8 1 1
First Alert 0.8 13 21
Table 4: Simulated model evaluation on retrospective data with a partially-
effective intervention
Threshold Prevented Outcomes Alerts
0.2 606 907
0.4 74 495
0.6 0 152
0.8 27 24
Table 5: Simulated randomized trial results evaluating alert models with a
partially-effective intervention
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We then applied each of these four alert models to the test set to generate
the alerts that would have been observed had these models been running. Of
course, these models were not actually running when the data were generated,
meaning that the “observed” alerts in the test set are virtual and did not actually
have any effect on the generation of subsequent data. For each model, we then
calculated the counts in the confusion matrices corresponding to the aggregated
time, fixed time, and first alert evaluations. We used an outcome lookahead
window of 5 timepoints for the aggregated time evaluation and set t∗ = 10 for
the fixed time evaluation. We report the numbers of true positives and positives
for each of these in table 4.
Finally, we used each of these models (and a null model that never triggers
alerts) in prospective simulations to generate the data that would have been
observed if the model were running live and controlling the delivery of the
intervention. This simulates a five-armed randomized trial with one model in
each arm, plus the null control. We assigned 1000 patients to each arm of our
simulated trial. We report the difference in the number of outcomes and the
number of alerts between each model arm and the control arm in table 5.
4.2 Results
Firstly, we observe that the number of true positives in the first alert evaluation
is indeed an estimated upper bound for the number of prevented outcomes. It
is, however, an estimate, and in some cases can be exceeded, as is the case in
our simulation when the risk threshold is 0.8. This is in contrast to the number
of true positives in the aggregated time evaluation, which sometimes is much
larger than the number of prevented outcomes, and sometimes much smaller.
When it is smaller (e.g. with the 0.2 threshold), it is because the aggregated
time evaluation is using a lookahead window and thus cannot measure any
potential effect on outcomes in the far future. On the other hand, there is also
no guarantee that the intervention is effective in the short term, and thus it is
also possible to overestimate the number of prevented outcomes. Not knowing
which of these effects will win out is what makes the number of true positives in
the aggregated time evaluation impossible to interpret, whereas in the first alert
evaluation, we can be sure that the number of true positives is an overestimate
of the number of prevented outcomes.
The number of positives in both the aggregate time and first alert evalua-
tions are good estimates of the alert burdens prospectively encountered in our
simulated trials. The two numbers of positives are the same because we struc-
tured our alert system to turn off after firing a single alert. If multiple alerts
were possible, the number of positives in the aggregated time evaluation would
increase, while the number of positives in the first alert evaluation would stay
the same. The number of alerts in the prospective trial would also be expected
to increase, but not necessarily by as much as would be implied by the aggre-
gated time evaluation. It could easily be the case that a real alert decreases
the subsequent possibility of alerts, which could make the number of positives
an overestimate. The opposite could also be the case. The first alert evalua-
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tion avoids this issue by claiming that the number of positives estimates only
the number of first alerts (i.e. the number of patients who ever experience any
alert), which will at least be a consistent underestimate of the total number of
alerts.
Finally, the numbers estimated in the fixed time evaluation seem to bear no
relationship to the number of prevented outcomes or the number of observed
alerts. This is to be expected- if our simulated randomized trial had been
structured to apply a model at a pre-defined point in time (e.g. t∗ = 10)
and only count outcomes after that point, the fixed time evaluation would have
provided the appropriate upper bound on prevented outcomes. This underscores
the fact that these methods are not competing to estimate the same thing; they
estimate different quantities altogether.
5 Example: Advanced Alert Monitor
In addition to our simulated data, we also applied the risk model from Kipnis
et al. [1] (the ”Advanced Alert Monitor”) to generate risk scores for a large
test set designed as follow-up for that study. The data consist of N inpatient
encounters over the course of NT years. Each patient in the dataset is assigned
a risk score at each hour of their stay by an existing risk model trained to
estimate their risk clinical deterioration (unplanned transfer to the ICU or in-
hospital ward death in “full-code” patients) in the next 12 hours.
We used the risk scores generated by their model to build four alert systems
based on thresholds of 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04 and generated the virtual
alerts that would have been observed had the model been running silently in
the background. We then applied the three evaluation strategies to these data
to generate counts of true positives and positives according to each approach.
We used a lookahead window of 12 for the aggregated time evaluation and t∗ = 4
(hours from admission) for the fixed time evaluation.
Evaluation Threshold True Positives Positives
Aggregated Time 0.01 87320 3637960
Aggregated Time 0.02 54127 1272158
Aggregated Time 0.03 38164 656134
Aggregated Time 0.04 28879 406987
Fixed Time 0.01 2583 93997
Fixed Time 0.02 1657 37009
Fixed Time 0.03 1165 19859
Fixed Time 0.04 904 12591
First Alert 0.01 14626 248356
First Alert 0.02 11728 131296
First Alert 0.03 9798 85388
First Alert 0.04 8351 61753
Table 6: Evaluations of risk model from Kipnis et al. [1]
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Since these are retrospective data, we cannot compare these results to the
results we would have obtained by using these alert models in different arms
of a randomized trial. However, these data are useful because they illustrate
how these evaluation strategies can be applied to a large, real-world dataset.
Furthermore, the results are clearly divergent between the different evaluation
strategies in ways that mirror the divergences we observe in simulated data.
6 Discussion
If only retrospective data is available and the intervention is not represented
in the data, we recommend that practitioners employ the first alert evaluation
method to evaluate repeated predictions models. Our argument is not that it
“works better” than other methods for estimating the same thing, but that
it estimates a quantity (or bounds on a quantity) that is actually of interest,
whereas other approaches do not. Without assumptions, typical metrics of
machine learning model performance calculated from retrospective data have no
relation in theory to clinical utility. Using metrics based on confusion matrices
to evaluate repeated predictions models is akin to fitting a square peg in a round
hole.
The fundamental problem with the use of non-interventional retrospective
data for model evaluation is that these data contain no information on how a
putative intervention might affect outcomes. In single-prediction models, alert
burdens are easy to estimate and assuming a risk ratio that is constant across
the population makes the number of true positives in retrospective data a good
predictor of the number of outcomes that would be prevented prospectively
(although this assumption may not be warranted). Things are more complicated
in repeated-prediction settings, but if the alert system is structured so that it
would be turned off after the first alert or outcome, it is possible to estimate
the alert burden and an upper bound on the number of outcomes that could be
prevented. More targeted estimates of the number of prevented outcomes are
possible, but only under strong assumptions about the effect of the intervention
and how it varies in time.
The conclusion is that a predictive model (or any model used to trigger
an intervention) cannot be thoroughly evaluated using non-interventional ret-
rospective data. Evaluations without interventional data either do not estimate
meaningful quantities, require strong assumptions, or are limited to estimating
best-case scenario bounds.
We recommend considering the intervention that the model is meant to tar-
get before evaluating the model. If the intervention is known, and represented
in retrospective data, off-policy evaluation methods can be used to estimate,
e.g. the anticipated reduction in outcomes from using a given model to tar-
get the intervention [28, 29, 30, 31]. Moreover, it is possible to train models
to optimize these metrics in the first place using policy learning methods in-
stead of training models that predict risk of an outcome. In effect, risk mod-
eling is the wrong framework altogether for building early-warning systems or
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model-triggered alerts when the intervention or a proxy thereof is available in
retrospective data.
Risk models may still have utility as a composite of information about a
patient, similar to a lab test or a traditional acuity score. But without very
careful design or prospective evaluation, they should not be assumed to optimize
the allocation of an intervention, no matter how well they perform in terms of
standard predictive metrics. This is especially true in time-varying settings,
where the assumptions necessary to link standard metrics to clinical utility are
usually complex and unverifiable.
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